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This Chapter critically explores the justifications, scope and limits of immigration detention 
in Australia and the United Kingdom, and makes a distinctive contribution to the developing 
preventive justice scholarship alongside the established criminal law/procedure and counter-
terrorism focused studies.1 We critically reflect on the combination of preventive and 
administrative rationales for immigration detention, and consider the anticipated harms that 
states claim both requires and validates prolonged periods of incarceration as a valid 
regulatory tool of immigration control.  We examine how conventional, public lawbased 
constraints on executive action are absent, ineffective, or present in attenuated forms in this 
regulatory space. Without orthodox and effective checks and balances that promote 
substantive and procedural justice, protracted and even indefinite periods of detention for 
many protection seekers have eventuated.2 We conclude the Chapter by indicating how 
                                                 
1 E.g. Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner (eds), Preventive Justice (Oxford University Press, 2014) ch 10. For 
a critical introduction to preventive justice scholarship see Tamara Tullich’s chapter. 
2 Prolonged detention can be properly characterised as arbitrary (or, ‘disproportionate’ under human rights law) 
when viewed in the light of the general justifications supporting detention. See, Carol S Steiker, 
‘Proportionality as a Limit on Preventive Justice: Promises and Pitfalls’ in Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner 
  
administrative and/or judicial review processes might be reformed in each context so that the 
necessity and proportionality of immigration detention, including preventive rationales for 
detention, can be more effectively scrutinised.  
 
Australian Perspectives 
Regulating Administrative Detention  
This part focuses upon the Australian government’s use of detention for ‘unlawful non-
citizens’, in particular, irregular maritime arrivals seeking refuge who are governed through 
prolonged deprivation of liberty. This practice occurs onshore and, also, offshore  at sea and 
in third countries pursuant to bilateral regional processing agreements.3 
 
Onshore Detention 
In 1992, immigration detention was conceived of as an extraordinary measure ‘aimed at boat 
people’, temporary in nature and time-limited.4 The measure was justified in two ways; on an 
administrative basis linked to effective processing and determination of entry claims and for  
preventive reasons aimed at the deterrence of irregular maritime migration from South East 
Asia.5  
 
Subsequently, the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) removed important temporal constraints 
and established a uniform scheme of mandatory detention for all unlawful non-citizens 
divorced from the detainee’s personal circumstances. Under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 
detention of unlawful non-citizens6 by the executive, without judicial order or warrant is 
                                                 
and Patrick Tomlin (eds), Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) ch 
10. 
3 On offshore processing and detention, see, AG v Secretary of Justice [2013] NRSC 10 (18 June 2013); Plaintiff 
M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 327 ALR 369; and, Namah v Pato [2016] 
PGSC 12; SC1496 (22 April 2016). 
4 See the Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) that inserted s 54Q into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and 
limited detention to 273 days’; and, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 May 
1992, 2370 (Gerard Hand). 
5 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 May 1992, 2370 (Gerard Hand). 
6 Generally, any person who is not a ‘lawful non-citizen’ (i.e., holds a valid visa) is an ‘unlawful non-citizen’: 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 13(1), 14(1). 
  
authorised.7 Relevantly, where ‘officers’ know or suspect a person to be an unlawful non-
citizen in the ‘migration zone’, or in an ‘excised offshore place’, then immigration detention 
is mandatory. For persons seeking to enter the ‘migration zone’ who would (upon effecting 
entry) be unlawful non-citizens, detention is permitted. Non-citizens liable to be detained for 
prolonged periods include protection visa claimants pending administrative decisions about 
their refugee status and visa eligibility, and ‘declared’ refugees (within the meaning of the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees – together, ‘Refugees Convention’)8 whose visa claims are refused or cancelled 
on security or adverse character grounds, but who cannot be removed or deported. 
 
In 2008, the Australian Labor government signalled a shift away from a presumption of 
secure detention for unlawful non-citizens pending resolution of their legal status.9 This, 
‘risk-based’ policy framework was infused by ‘human rights’ ideals respecting individual 
liberty, and prohibiting arbitrary – or disproportionate – detention.10 Unlawful non-citizens 
were to be initially detained for administrative reasons: health, identity, and security checks. 
Government policy provided that ongoing detention was justifiable on specific, preventive, 
grounds, namely:  
 
(1) on protective grounds, for non-citizens posing an unacceptable risk to the 
community (be it on character, security or health grounds); and  
(2) on non-compliance grounds, to prevent future immigration offences in respect of 
non-citizens who repeatedly breach visa conditions.11  
 
                                                 
7 The key provision requiring (or permitting) detention is s 189, in conjunction with ss 196, 198. 
8 Opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) and opened for signature 
31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967). 
9 See Commonwealth, Department of Immigration and Citizenship - Annual Report 2008–09, Parl Paper No 351 
(2009) 114.  
10 See Commonwealth, Immigration Detention in Australia: A New Beginning (Criteria for Release from 
Immigration Detention): Joint Standing Committee on Migration, Parl Paper No 571 (2008). 
11 See Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Procedures Advice Manual 3 (PAM3): Migration Act 
Detention Services Manual (Canberra: The Dept, 1994) (PAM3) referencing the immigration detention values 
announced in July 2008. 
  
By 2011, the policy had been effectively abandoned with unlawful maritime arrivals being 
detained for the duration of their processing.12 The discord between Labor’s detention policy 
and practice is well-illustrated by the arbitrary and discriminatory moratorium on the 
processing of Sri Lankan and Afghan asylum seekers’ claims during 2010. This led to asylum 
seekers, who had arrived by boat, being warehoused in the Curtin Immigration Detention 
Centre in Western Australia, effectively left in limbo for months, whilst processing of their 
protection visa claims was suspended in a vain attempt to deter other Sri Lankan and Afghan 
asylum seekers from coming to Australia via unlawful means.13 
 
Following the Coalition’s federal election victory in September 2013, the numbers of 
detainees in secure detention has fallen markedly due to: (1) bridging visa grants facilitating 
community release; (2) use of community detention; (3) transfers of protection seekers to 
regional processing centres; and (4) rapid decline in irregular maritime arrivals who have 
been deterred or denied entry by maritime interdiction. But the average time spent in 
detention has risen sharply from 72 days in July 2013, to a peak of 445 days in December 
2015.14 Here government policy and calculated executive inertia, rather than case complexity, 
may account for the protracted periods of detention for unauthorised arrivals. For those 
detainees arriving before regional re-settlement was introduced in July 2013,15 caught up in 
the backlog of asylum cases, the Coalition government simply deferred resolution of 
protection visa claims until legislative amendments, reintroducing temporary protection visas, 
with retrospective effect, were passed in December 2014.16  
 
                                                 
12 Australian Human Rights Committee, Submission to the Joint Select Committee on Australia’s Immigration 
Detention Network, Joint Select Committee on Australia’s Immigration Detention Network, (August 2011) 14 
[25]. Labor’s policy shifted again in November 2011 when detainees were released into the community on safe 
haven/bridging visas (see Plaintiff M79/2012 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 252 CLR 
336). Then, post August 13 2012, Labor’s ‘no advantage’ policy applied, reviving offshore regional (refugee) 
processing. 
13 See, Peter Billings, ‘Juridical Exceptionalism in Australia: Law, Nostalgia and the Exclusion of Others’ 
(2011) 20(2) Griffith Law Review 271, 296-297. 
14 Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Immigration Detention and Community Statistics 
Summary (30 December 2015) Australian Government (online) 11; and Australian Human Rights 
Commission, The Forgotten Children: National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention (November 
2014) (online) 56. 
15 The regional resettlement policy augmented regional processing arrangements by providing for resettlement, 
on Papua New Guinea and Nauru respectively, and prohibited resettlement in Australia for refugees. 
16 See, eg, Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 253 CLR 219, the 
plaintiff’s detention was unlawfully prolonged for reasons related to the executive’s policy of not granting 
permanent protection visas to irregular maritime arrivals. 
  
In short, onshore immigration detention has been, officially, directed at protective purposes, 
public health and safety are said to be protected by incapacitating protection seekers who, 
upon arrival, may carry a contagious disease, or who officials consider pose an unacceptable 
risk to public safety/security. Detention also serves to manage those non-citizens who 
officials believe are a ‘flight’ risk, to prevent them absconding. Detention also serves 
ancillary administrative purposes relating to visa processing/adjudication and facilitating 
removal/deportation. General deterrence of irregular maritime migration has served as an, 
official, rationale justifying detention onshore in the past. But presently, deterrence only, 
officially, grounds extra-territorial maritime detention practices, to which attention now turns.  
 
Maritime Detention 
Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) commenced on 19 December 2013. A decisive aspect of 
OSB is a maritime border security operation directed squarely at preventive aims, namely: 
efficiently managing migration controls, deterring people smuggling operations, mitigating 
the risk of harm to protection seekers by deterring hazardous maritime ventures, and 
promoting compliance with migration law by preventing unauthorised maritime arrivals from 
entering Australia. Interdiction at sea was resuscitated following a sharp rise in unauthorised 
maritime arrivals during 2009-2012. The strategy has been executed via ‘tow-backs’ and 
‘take-backs’ and entails interception, deprivation of liberty, conspicuously unfair screening 
procedures and limited judicial oversight. 
 
Tow-backs have been executed by interception at sea, coupled with returns to neighbouring 
transit countries. For example, asylum seekers have been intercepted en route to Australia, 
detained for several days on border protection vessels and then coerced into cramped and hot 
carceral spaces on disposable lifeboats, and towed-back to the edge of Indonesian territory. 
Worryingly, this has occurred without an assessment of whether Australia’s international law 
obligations are engaged.17  
 
                                                 
17 See Michael Bachelard, ‘Vomitous and terrifying: the lifeboats used to turn back asylum seekers’, Sydney 
Morning Herald (online) 2 March 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/national/vomitous-and-terrifying-the-
lifeboats-used-to-turn-back-asylum-seekers-20140301-33t6s.html>. 
  
Equally troublesome, take-backs have involved interception at sea coupled with either direct 
repatriations following perfunctory screening procedures,18 or attempted ‘safe third country’ 
returns. In respect of the latter there was a failed attempt to return Sri Lankan interdictees to 
India in July 2014. The legality of this preventive action was tested in CPCF v Minister for 
Immigration and Border Protection19 (CPCF), considered below. Ultimately, for preventive 
purposes, maritime interdictees face the real prospect of a prolonged and open-ended period 
detained at sea, while ‘taking’ decisions are made, given effect, and arrangements are made 
for detainees’ disembarkation elsewhere. 
 
Exploring Legal Constraints on Immigration Detention: Onshore  
Immigration detention raises risks of executive overreach and human rights infringements, 
and poses a critical need for effective checks and balances. The High Court of Australia has, 
over many years, entertained several challenges to the legality of prolonged immigration 
detention. In a recent case, three judges expressed the view that immigration detention 
provisions are constitutionally valid only if they are for relevant statutory purposes and if 
they are subject to clear ‘reasonable time’ constraints.20 So the bleak prospect that detention 
might endure for the term of a non-citizen’s natural life (countenanced in Al-Kateb v 
Godwin)21 is doubtful, due to implied constitutional constraints. However, these limits on 
immigration detention rest on the capacity of the court to identify and agree on valid statutory 
purposes, and an assessment of what is a ‘reasonable time’ to achieve those purposes.  
 
Statutory Purposes 
‘The common law does not recognise any executive warrant authorising arbitrary 
detention.’22 And immigration detention is not arbitrary because the executive’s power is 
                                                 
18 See, eg, Matthew Knott, ‘Asylum seekers screened at sea returned to Sri Lanka’ Sydney Morning Herald 
(online) 7 July 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/asylum-seekers-screened-at-sea-
returned-to-sri-lanka-20140706-3bh3x.html>. 
19 (2015) 316 ALR 1. 
20  Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship (2013) 251 CLR 322, 
369 [139] (Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ). 
21 (2004) 219 CLR 562, 575 (Gleeson CJ), 651 (Hayne J). 
22 (2013) 251 CLR 322, 369 [139] (Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ).  
  
constrained; it is directed to particular statutory purposes, coupled with temporal limits.23 In 
Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship24 
(M76), Hayne J observed that mandatory detention provisions served the broad preventive 
purpose of immigration control, ‘to control the arrival and presence of non-citizens in 
Australia.’25 Whereas in Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration26 (S4) the High Court 
of Australia, having identified the broad regulatory objectives of the Migration Act 1958 
(Cth), stated that mandatory detention served purely administrative purposes, namely:  
 
the purpose of removal from Australia; the purpose of receiving, investigating and determining an 
application for a visa permitting the alien to enter and remain in Australia; or, in a case such as the 
present, the purpose of determining whether to permit a valid application for a visa.27 
 
This passage can be read as fully identifying the statutory purposes underlying onshore 
mandatory detention, though the list of permissible purposes underpinning non-citizens’ 
detention may not be closed.28 In S4 the High Court did not expressly reject or endorse 
alternative statutory purposes for detention suggested in earlier cases. For example, 
immigration detention has been interpreted as legitimately serving an exclusionary purpose, 
by segregating unlawful non-citizens from the wider community.29 In Al-Kateb two judges 
decided that preventing the entry of unlawful non-citizens into the community pending an 
entry or removal decision, was an ancillary purpose underpinning detention.30 Three other 
judges went further, observing that entry, removal and exclusion from the community could 
justify detention. Thus, exclusion was not merely ancillary; it could justify detention absent 
other statutory purposes (which might be exhausted) related to entry, or removal.31 Exclusion 
                                                 
23 Ibid. The temporal limits are not precisely fixed at the time detention commences, but statutory purposes must 
be fulfilled as soon as reasonably practicable (i.e. capable of achievement).  
24 (2013) 251 CLR 322. 
25 Ibid 366 [127] (emphasis added). 
26 (2014) 253 CLR 219. 
27 Ibid 231 [26]. See also, Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 327 
ALR 369, 310 [46] (French CJ, Kiefel and Nettle JJ), 317 [94] (Bell J), 332 [184] (Gageler J), 343 [260] 
(Keane J), and 362 [392] (Gordon J, dissenting) (concerning offshore refugee processing on Nauru and 
incidental executive detention). 
28 Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 327 ALR 369, 360-1 [382] 
(Gordon J). 
29 Eg, Re Woolley; Ex parte M276/2003 (2004) 225 CLR 1, 75–7 [222]–[228] (Hayne J). 
30 Al-Kateb,576 [17] (Gleeson CJ), 609 [126]–[127] (Gummow J).  
31 Ibid 584–5 [45]–[46] (McHugh J), 644–5 [247] (Hayne J), 658–9 [289] (Callinan J). 
  
was said to advance protective purposes, preventing undesired infiltration of, or presence in, 
the community, and the attainment of de facto citizenship.32 Importantly – and despite the 
clear similarities between the lived experience of immigration detention and penal 
incarceration – there is no judicial recognition that immigration detention is imposed as 
punishment for an offence relating to unauthorised arrival.33 
 
Another protective purpose was implied by Heydon J in M47 /2012 v Director General of 
Security34 (M47): ‘the detention of unlawful non-citizens who threaten the safety or welfare 
of the community because of the risks they pose to Australia’s security.’35 One of the 
difficulties with this justification (which reflects government policy) is that detainees may be 
incarcerated – on protective grounds  due to adverse security/character assessments, in 
circumstances where they pose no real danger to the community.36 This circumstance is 
aggravated by the fact that non-citizens with adverse security assessments subject to removal 
do not enjoy due process via administrative merits review,37 and judicial review is largely 
ineffectual.38 
 
In M76, Kiefel and Keane JJ also identified exclusion as a discrete purpose underlying 
detention. Significantly, their Honours observed that even if the legislative scheme were read 
as constrained by both a purposive (removal) and temporal limitation (reasonably 
practicable) and also an implied qualification that this be effected within a reasonable 
timeframe, continued detention would, nonetheless, continue to be lawful. This was attributed 
                                                 
32 Ibid 584 [46] (McHugh J), 659 [289] (Callinan J). See also, Re Woolley; Ex parte M276/2003 (2004) 225 
CLR 1, 46–7 [115] (McHugh J).  
33 Re Woolley; Ex parte M276/2003 (2004) 225 CLR 1, 14 [26] (Gleeson CJ); M76, 385 [207] (Kiefel and 
Keane JJ); Jaffarie v Director-General of Security (2014) 226 FCR 505, 532–3 [95] (Flick and Perram JJ) 
citing Al-Kateb, 584 [44]–[45] (McHugh J). 
34 (2012) 251 CLR 1. 
35Ibid 136 [346]. This purpose correlates to government policy: see PAM3, above n 11. 
36 (Ibid 194 [534] (Bell J). The Australian Security Intelligence Oganisation’s (ASIO) security assessments 
capture a larger cohort of refugees than those falling within the exclusionary provisions of the Refugees 
Convention. 
37 In 2012 an Independent Reviewer of Adverse Security Assessments was appointed to provide periodic non-
binding reviews of adverse security assessments relating to non-citizens who engage Australia’s protection 
obligations (Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Independent Reviewer of Adverse Security Assessments 
(2012) Australian Government (online)). As a consequence of this process 21 detainees were released from 
detention in 2014/15 (Commonwealth Ombudsman, An analysis of reports under s 4860 of the Migration Act 
1958 sent to the Minister by the Ombudsman in 2014/15 (August 2015) (online) 13). 
38 Jaffarie v Director General of Security (2014) 226 FCR 505, 521–2 [48] (Flick and Perram JJ).  
  
to the ‘evident purpose’ (underlying s 189) of preventing unauthorised entry into the 
Australian community.39  
 
In summary, the combination of preventive and administrative purposes underlying 
immigration detention, and the phrasing of these aims in expansive terms, sits uneasily 
alongside the unanimous judgment in S4, which clearly stated that detention serves specific 
statutory purposes: removal, investigation and determination of a visa application, and to 
determine whether to permit a valid visa. Suffice to say, it is far from easy to disentangle and 
identify the legitimate purpose(s) of immigration detention.  
 
Temporal Constraints 
In Al-Kateb, the High Court of Australia determined that the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 
supplied a clear mandate requiring unlawful non-citizens to be detained until removed, 
deported or granted a visa. The law, it was held, authorised prolonged detention without a 
fixed end-point. The High Court was, subsequently, invited to overrule Al-Kateb in M47. 
M47 was officially declared a refugee but refused a visa to enter Australia because of an 
adverse security assessment. Accordingly, M47 remained in detention pending removal. It 
was argued that there was no reasonable prospect or likelihood of another country agreeing to 
admit M47 and, because there was no realistic prospect of removal, detention was unlimited 
and, therefore, unlawful. 
 
A majority of the High Court of Australia disposed of the matter in favour of M47, but 
without the need to address the arguments directed at the correctness of Al-Kateb.  However, 
Gummow and Bell JJ (dissenting) determined that Al-Kateb should not be followed.40 Their 
Honours favoured the construction of s 198 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) advanced by 
Gleeson CJ (in the minority in Al-Kateb) which ‘better accommodates the basic right of 
personal liberty.’41 Importantly, Gleeson CJ considered that if removal of a detainee ceased to 
be a practical possibility, then detention must cease, at least for as long as that situation 
                                                 
39 M76, 379–80 [182]–[183].  
40 M47, 61 [120], 68 [145] (Gummow J), 193 [533] (Bell J). 
41 Ibid 61 [120] (Gummow J). 
  
continues. It followed that the statutory duty of removal imposed on an immigration officer 
subsists, but is in abeyance, where removal is impractical.42  
 
Notably, in M47, Gummow and Bell JJ claimed that the majority reasoning in Al-Kateb was 
weakened by the absence of a discussion of the ‘principle of legality’,43 which mandates that 
the legislature must manifest an intention to abrogate fundamental principles, infringe rights 
or depart from the general system of law (the ‘clear statement’ principle).44 Subsequently, in 
M76, Kiefel and Keane JJ refuted that view, adding that there was no legislative lacuna and 
so no work for the principle of legality to do.45 Their Honours highlighted the absence of 
precise temporal limitations on the duration of detention for removal purposes.46 
Accordingly, Al-Kateb, M47 and M76 show that the interpretation of temporal elements in 
the legislative scheme supporting immigration detention divides judicial opinion, and equally 
divisive is the applicability of the ‘principle of legality’. 
 
Constitutional Constraints 
A constitutional head of power – the naturalization and aliens power contained in s 51(xix) 
Commonwealth Constitution – supports the administrative confinement of unlawful non-
citizens in detention.47 However, the effect of Chapter III of the Constitution is that, certain 
exceptional categories aside, deprivation of liberty can only be made by judicial order on 
conviction for an offence after adjudication of guilt.48 Among the recognised exceptions to 
this rule is that non-citizens’ liberty may be constrained for the purpose of determining 
questions about the person’s entry or removal or deportation. The constitutional issue is 
whether detention can lawfully continue when statutory purposes are exhausted (or, 
frustrated) and are incapable of fulfilment within a reasonable time frame.  
 
                                                 
42 Al-Kateb, 578 [22] (Gleeson CJ).  
43 M47, 60 [119] (Gummow J), 193 [532] (Bell J). 
44 Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (O’Connor J). 
45 Justice Hayne re-affirmed the interpretative approach his Honour adopted, as part of the majority, in Al-
Kateb: M76, 366 [127]. 
46 M76, 379 [182] (Kiefel and Keane JJ). Cf Al-Kateb, (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ).  
47 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1. 
48 Jeffrey Steven Gordon, ‘Imprisonment and the Separation of Judicial Power: A Defence of a Categorical 
Immunity From Non-Criminal Detention’ (2012) 36(1) Melbourne University Law Review 41. 
  
The legislative requirement that detention is required until ‘removal is undertaken as soon as 
reasonably practicable’ may be read as importing a ‘reasonable time’ qualification, or else 
risk infringing Chapter III constraints. This idea stems from the case of Chu Kheng Lim v 
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs49 (Lim) where a majority of 
the High Court of Australia held that immigration detention is constitutionally valid only if 
the laws that require and authorise administrative detention are ‘limited to what is reasonably 
capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or necessary to enable an 
application for an entry permit to be made and considered.’50 In M76, Crennan, Bell and 
Gageler JJ revisited Lim, identifying a clear temporal limitation on detention: 
 
The necessity referred to in that holding in Lim is not that detention itself be necessary for the 
purposes of the identified administrative processes but that the period of detention be limited to 
the time necessarily taken in administrative processes directed to the limited purposes identified. 
The temporal limits and the limited purposes are connected such that the power to detain is not 
unconstrained.51 
 
Whereas, in M76 Hayne J, confirming Al-Kateb, stated that the power to detain unlawful non-
citizens was not unbounded, pinpointing the statutory duty to remove ‘as soon as reasonably 
practicable’, and purposive constraints which must be ‘ascertainable, and enforceable, [by the 
courts] at all times during its continuance’.52 His Honour harboured no doubts about the 
validity of laws authorising indefinite detention until removal for unauthorised non-citizens, 
concluding that the question of the law’s consistency ‘with basic tenets of common 
humanity’ was for Parliament and the polity to ponder.53 Kiefel and Keane JJ agreed that the 
detention laws were valid; executive detention, where removal was currently unfeasible, did 
not violate Chapter III.54  
 
                                                 
49 (1992) 176 CLR 1. 
50 Ibid 33 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
51 M76, 369 [139] (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). See also; S4, 231 [26], where French CJ, Hayne, 
Crennan, Kiefel and Keane JJ referred to the cited passage from Lim with apparent approval, and Plaintiff 
M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCA 1, 55 [184]-[185] (Gageler J).  
52 M76, 359 [98]–[99]. 
53 Ibid 367 [130]. 
54 Ibid 384–5 [205]–[208]. 
  
In summary, the High Court of Australia has recognised that detention laws have temporal 
limits that are necessary if the laws are to satisfy constitutional requirements. Where the 
judges differ is whether ‘reasonable practicability of removal’ must be read so as to require 
removal within a ‘reasonable time-frame’ in order to be valid. In M76 three judges (Crennan, 
Bell and Gageler JJ) offered support for the view that detention provisions are 
constitutionally valid laws if they are for relevant statutory purposes and if they are subject to 
clear ‘reasonable time’ constraints.55 Otherwise powers of executive detention can be 
characterised as punitive laws and unconstitutional.   
 
Exploring Legal Constraints on Preventive Detention: Interdiction at Sea  
In CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection56 the legality of executive 
detention beyond Australia’s borders, in the course of repelling protection seekers, was 
considered by the High Court of Australia. The Australian government relied on, inter alia, 
the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) (MPA)) to defeat the false imprisonment claim brought 
by the plaintiff. Significantly, s 72(4) MPA enabled a maritime officer to detain and take a 
person to a place outside the migration zone, including a place outside Australia, and  s 72(5) 
provided  for the restraint of a person on a vessel for the purposes of taking a person to 
another place.  
 
By a slender majority the Court decided that there was statutory authority to detain and take 
the interdictees to India, it was not a ‘speculative taking’, and therefore, constitutionally 
invalid. Pertinently, the Court rejected an alternative argument: that the actions of the 
maritime officers at sea were animated by an improper purpose – the deterrence of 
unauthorised maritime arrivals.  The plaintiffs argued that the statutory scheme was only 
directed at preventing contravention of or ensuring compliance with, the Migration Act 1958 
(Cth). Only two judges, Gageler and Keane JJ, addressed this argument and expressly 
rejected the claim that deterrence was an extraneous purpose vis-à-vis the MPA. Gageler J 
observed that the government’s general policy of deterrence was consistent with the twin 
purposes of ensuring compliance with s 42(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and preventing 
                                                 
55  Cf Lim, 73, where McHugh J doubted a long period of detention (over two years) could transform the 
character of immigration detention from administrative (non-punitive) to punitive. 
56 (2015) 316 ALR 1. 
  
contravention of s 42(1) from occurring in Australia.57 In summary, two members of the 
Court accepted that the MPA enabled maritime officers to intercept and detain non-citizens in 
the contiguous zone, and remove them to another place, as an incident of preventing a 
contravention of migration law pursuant to a policy of deterrence.58 
 
Remarkably, with the High Court of Australia’s decision pending, the government moved 
pre-emptively to reinforce executive maritime powers to undertake turn backs.59 The 
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy 
Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth), schedule 1, evidences a legislative intent to neutralise the effects 
that any negative ruling in CPCF might have had for Australia’s interdiction policy. 
Critically, the ‘detain and taking power’ was amended confirming that a detained vessel can 
be taken outside Australia and that the destination can repeatedly change.60 Plainly, for 
preventive purposes, maritime interdictees face the real prospect of a prolonged period 
detained at sea, while ‘taking’ decisions are made, given effect, and arrangements are made 
for detainees’ disembarkation elsewhere. The Australian government now enjoys exorbitant 
powers, generating uncertainty about the duration of maritime detention. Limiting such 
detention to ‘reasonable’ periods, while relevant statutory purposes are pursued, provides a 
veneer of legitimacy but negligible security from protracted detention.61 This temporal 
constraint does not enable the deprivation of liberty at sea to be rigorously scrutinised by the 
courts, to guard against arbitrariness.62 Indeed, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Torture observed that Australia’s maritime powers risk violating the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture ‘because it allows for the arbitrary detention and refugee 
determination at sea, without access to lawyers.’63 
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United Kingdom Perspectives 
Regulating Immigration Detention  
In the United Kingdom, the stated justification for immigration detention is ‘the effective 
maintenance of immigration control’ – the need to restrict the movement of people who have 
yet to persuade the State of their right to enter and remain or whom the State wishes to 
remove. For those who support an unfettered sovereign right to control borders and admission 
to territory, detention – or incapacitation – is regarded as necessary to prevent a risk of harm, 
or an actual harm, from occurring. ‘Harm’ is often related to the ‘flight risk’: the fear that the 
subject will abscond, disappear, commit or contribute to an undesirable act or a criminal 
offence.64 Despite a low flight risk, and the requirement to use detention as a last resort, 
protection seekers are subject to detention for preventive reasons. They are increasingly likely 
to be detained for administrative convenience, rather than harm prevention – that is, their 
detention is argued to be facilitative for the State in some way.65 The detention estate 
currently comprises ten designated immigration removal centres, which are operated by either 
the National Offender Management Service or private contractors. Between January and 
September 2015, 20,744 people entered detention.66 
 
Powers to Detain 
The Immigration Act 1971 (UK) contains the power to detain.67 Before 1987, the detention of 
protection seekers was not routine.68 Arguably, this was due to the perceived lack of a need to 
detain given the low number of asylum seekers. Until 1989 asylum claims remained below 
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4,500,69  but as applications increased, reaching an all-time high of 84,130 in 2002, 
successive British governments introduced a range of new policies, with significant changes 
made to the detention regime for protection seekers. 
 
Immigration officers and the Home Secretary possess a wide power to detain people.70  
Broadly, detention can occur pending refugee status determination, pending a decision to 
remove and pending removal. Immigration officers can also detain an individual at a port for 
up to three hours if the officer thinks the individual may be liable to arrest.71  Two 
remarkable, if not unique, features pertain to United Kingdom immigration detention: there is 
no automatic bail hearing72 and no statutory time limit on the length of detention. To be 
lawful, detention must comply with domestic legislation and meet relevant human rights 
obligations arising, notably, under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) and the European 
Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR).73   
Detention Policy and Guidance: The Purpose of Detention 
The power to detain is discretionary so attention must focus on policy, operational 
instructions and detention centre rules for further direction on the power’s implementation.74 
Operational guidance for immigration officers states that ‘[t]he power to detain must be 
retained in the interests of maintaining effective immigration control’ but ‘there is a 
presumption in favour of temporary admission or release and, wherever possible, alternatives 
to detention are used’.75 Furthermore:  
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Detention is most usually appropriate:  
 to effect removal;  
 initially to establish a person’s identity or basis of claim; or  
 where there is reason to believe that the person will fail to comply with any conditions 
attached to the grant of temporary admission or release.76 
 
The policy specifies numerous factors to be assessed when considering the need for initial or 
continued detention: the likelihood of and timescale for removal; a history of 
absconding/non-compliance/breach of immigration law; the subject’s age, vulnerability and 
ties with the United Kingdom; whether the subject has a settled address and employment; 
whether there are outstanding legal processes that might incentivise keeping in touch with 
authorities; risk of offending or harm to the public; and any history of torture, inform the 
immigration officer’s decision about detention.77 Furthermore, the officer or Home Secretary 
must inform the prospective detainee of the reasons for detention, and government policy 
currently details five: (1) the person is likely to abscond if given temporary admission or 
release; (2) there is insufficient reliable information to decide on whether to grant the person 
temporary admission or release; (3) the person’s removal from the United Kingdom is 
imminent; (4) the person needs to be detained whilst alternative arrangements are made for 
their care; and (5) the person’s release is not considered conducive to the public good.78 
Protection seekers can fall within one or more of these categories.  
 
So, detention can take place for a range of reasons, some of which are about preventing some 
unspecified harm – ‘[the persons’] release is not conducive to the public good’; ‘[the person 
is]likely to abscond’ (and become untraceable/misbehave/become a burden) – while others 
are more elliptical – ‘[the person’s] removal … is imminent; [the person] need[s] to be 
detained whilst alternative arrangements are made’ (and they might become untraceable/ 
misbehave/become a burden if given their liberty). The harm occasioned to the detainee is, 
unsurprisingly, not considered, despite the view that ‘depriving a person of his or her liberty 
intentionally harms that person’.79 Rather, as both law and policy make clear, the harm meted 
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out to the subject of detention, through deprivation of liberty, is considered warranted, even 
in the case of the most vulnerable individuals on occasions. 
Detained Fast Track 
Previously, government policy stated another purpose underpinning detention: ‘The 
application may be decided quickly using the fast track procedures’ – otherwise known as the 
Detained Fast Track system (DFT).  Although this reason has now been removed following 
the suspension of the DFT in 2015 (see below), the fast track detention of protection seekers 
is pertinent for our critique of preventive and administrative detention, to which our attention 
now turns. 
 
Prior to the DFT process, some asylum seeker applicants were detained but the majority were 
not.80 The idea of detention for mere ‘administrative convenience’ was unknown. In March 
2000 this changed with the opening of the first ‘reception centre’ in Oakington, 
Cambridgeshire.81 The adoption of a benign term ‘reception centre’ is striking, so too the use 
of detention for a new purpose – for applications that can be decided quickly  detention only 
for the duration of the initial decision, and for a limited period ‘of about 7 days’. The 
rationale was that due to the high number of claimants (in 2000, this stood at 80, 315),82 the 
Home Office needed protection seekers to be available for early interview and further 
representations. The scheme was extended, first to Harmondsworth Removal Centre in 2003 
(note the shift in terminology to ‘removal centre’) for single young men, and then to Yarl’s 
Wood Removal Centre in 2005, for women. Now, detention would be for the duration of 
initial decision and appeal. The Minister promised ‘we will detain straightforward claimants 
to enable a quick initial decision and swift removal after any appeal, providing they meet the 
criteria for detention’.83 While Oakington could be described as ‘fast’ the new scheme was 
intended to be ‘superfast’: induction and substantive interviews in two days, an in-country 
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right of appeal within two days and the whole case, if refused, could be finalised in just five 
weeks.  
 
This shift towards detention for administrative convenience can be characterised as 
preventive detention. The object is to ensure immediate access to individuals: to ensure they 
are available for examination, interview, decision, appeal and removal. Simply put, fast-track 
detainees were prevented from moving freely within the United Kingdom. From a harm 
perspective, the government argued that the asylum seeker system was under threat by the 
numbers, backlogs were growing, and people were waiting years for decisions. But this type 
of detention, ostensibly with an administrative or facilitative objective, poses a number of 
critical legal questions. The answers to which are complex, encompassing domestic, 
European Union and international law and policy. 
Exploring (Legal) Constraints on Preventive Detention in the United Kingdom 
Detention can be challenged in the High Court in England and Wales either by habeas corpus 
or judicial review, or by judicial review in Scotland. Habeas corpus applications are normally 
concerned with the power to detain, whereas judicial review might focus on the wider 
exercise of the discretion to detain.84 The courts have a duty to guard the liberty of the person 
jealously, to construe broad statutory discretions narrowly and ensure they are exercised for 
solely for statutory purposes.85 Where detention conditions are sufficiently poor, this may 
breach art 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.86 Pressure can also be brought to bear on the use and conditions of detention by 
independent oversight of the detention estate,87 political intervention and campaigning by 
civil society.   
Time in Detention 
European Union law imposes a maximum time limit of six months on detention during the 
return process (any extension thereafter is up to twelve months), but the United Kingdom has 
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not implemented the Return Directive 2008/115/EC and is, therefore, not bound by it.88 The, 
apparently, open-ended length of time an individual can be incarcerated is one of the most 
contentious aspects of immigration detention.  However, the period in detention must be 
reasonable in the circumstances.89 Many of the cases involving protracted detention relate to 
individuals imprisoned prior to removal or deportation, often following time served in prison 
for commission of a criminal offence.  Protection seekers, whose claims have been refused, 
and who have been convicted of a criminal offence and served a prison sentence, also fall 
into this category. The leading case is R (Hardial Singh) v Governor of Durham Prison90 
(Hardial Singh) recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in R (Lumba & Mighty) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department91 (Lumba & Mighty).  
 
In Hardial Singh, Woolf J stated that the power to detain was impliedly limited to a period 
that was reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of the detention.92 In Lumba & Mighty, 
Lord Dyson sought to clarify what have become known as the Hardial Singh principles.93 
Referring to his own judgment in R (I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,94 he 
stated that it was impossible and undesirable to produce an exhaustive list of the 
circumstances that are, or may be, relevant to the question of how long it is reasonable to 
detain a person pending deportation. However, relevant factors to consider included:  
 
the length of the period of detention; the nature of the obstacles which stand in the path of the Secretary 
of State preventing a deportation; the diligence, speed and effectiveness of the steps taken by the 
Secretary of State to surmount such obstacles; the conditions in which the detained person is being 
kept; the effect of detention on him and his family; the risk that if he is released from detention he will 
abscond; and the danger that, if released, he will commit criminal offences.95  
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Despite these judicial endeavours to determine what relevant factors inform a determination 
about the reasonableness of a period of detention period, without a fixed time-limit, there is 
always a risk that subjectivity will creep into any assessment of ‘a reasonable period’.96 
DFT 
The DFT regime has been subject to sustained judicial scrutiny. Firstly, R (on the application 
of Saadi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department97 (Saadi) presented an opportunity 
for the House of Lords and then European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), to reflect on the 
legality of seven day detention in Oakington.98 The House of Lords established that the right 
to detain asylum seekers existed, citing the Immigration Act 1971 (UK).99 Lord Slynn of 
Hadley decided that applicants could be held until the refugee determination was made; there 
was no need to show that there was a flight risk, nor was this type of detention limited to 
those who could not be granted temporary admission, for whatever reason.100 He opined that 
the large number of applicants who had to be considered quickly justified detention for a 
short period in acceptable physical conditions. This did not mean that the Home Secretary 
could detain without any limits where no examination had taken place or decision had been 
made. Further, the Home Secretary must not act in an arbitrary manner, and an immigration 
officer must act reasonably in fixing the examination time and arriving at a decision in the 
light of the objective of promoting speedy decision-making.101  For Lord Slynn the Oakington 
regime was reasonable and getting a speedy decision was ‘in the interests not only of the 
applicants but of those increasingly in the queue.’102 
 
The Saadi case also addressed the human rights implications of immigration detention. Article 
5(1)(f) of the ECHR provides deprivation of liberty is permissible where ‘the lawful arrest or 
detention of a person [is] to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of 
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a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.’ The 
ECtHR agreed with the United Kingdom domestic courts that ‘until a State has “authorised” 
entry to the country, any entry is “unauthorised” …’103 The European Court of Human Rights 
Grand Chamber did not accept that as soon as an asylum seeker has surrendered him or her-
self to the immigration authorities, he or she is seeking to effect an ‘authorised’ entry, with the 
result that detention cannot be justified under the first limb of article 5(1)(f).104 The Grand 
Chamber decided that to interpret article 5(1)(f) as only permitting detention of a person who 
was trying to evade entry restrictions was far too narrow a construction.105 What was important 
was that any deprivation of liberty had to be lawful, that is ‘a procedure prescribed by law’ had 
been followed and the individual was protected from arbitrariness.106 To avoid arbitrariness, 
detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of 
preventing unauthorised entry; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, 
bearing in mind that the measure is applicable to refugees who have fled from their own 
country; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the 
purpose pursued.107 Bizarrely, the ECtHR concluded that the United Kingdom authorities acted 
in good faith in detaining the applicant because the policy animating the Oakington regime 
‘was generally to benefit asylum seekers’, and a speedy decision was in the interests not only 
of the applicant but of those increasingly in the queue.108 Furthermore, ‘since the purpose of 
the deprivation of liberty was to enable the authorities quickly and efficiently to determine the 
applicant’s claim to asylum, his detention was closely connected to the purpose of preventing 
unauthorised entry.’ 109  But as the ministerial statements justifying Oakington attest, the 
purpose of the regime was never conceived of, or articulated, in terms of ‘benefitting’ asylum 
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seekers.  Moreover, the argument that detention is needed to prevent unauthorised entry of 
someone who had already arrived at Heathrow airport, claimed asylum, was permitted to leave 
and to return in accordance with reporting instructions, was tortuous. 
 
Further attempts to challenge the ‘superfast’ regime failed. In R (on the application of the 
Refugee Legal Centre) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,110 the Court of Appeal 
held that the accelerated system did not deprive claimants of a fair opportunity to put his or 
her case;111 nor was there an unacceptable risk of unfairness.112 Interestingly, the fact that 
some people might be detained for five weeks or longer (in excess of the ‘reasonable’ time of 
Oakington) was not under judicial review.  
 
Questions about the legality, fairness, reasonableness and proportionality of fast track 
detention were revisited in proceedings brought by Detention Action, a non-profit 
organisation.113 These issues were being revisited due to significant changes arising since the 
Saadi case, which had validated the first incarnation of fast track detention. There were now 
fewer asylum cases; the average time in detention was much longer than seven-to-ten days: 
23.5 days from entry to exhaustion of appeal rights; the only criterion guiding decision-
makers was whether a quick decision could be made; a very broad range of cases were 
included in the DFT, which had previously been considered too complex for a quick decision; 
there was limited scope for removal from the DFT; and a significant number of applicants 
were unrepresented. 
 
In R (on the application of Detention Action) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,114  Beatson LJ concluded that ‘detention in the fast track by the application of 
the ‘quick processing’ criteria, after the Secretary of State’s decision and pending appeal is 
not objectionable in principle and does not breach the DFT Guidance’.115 However, he judged 
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that it did not satisfy the requirements of clarity and transparency established by the Supreme 
Court in Lumba & Mighty. 116 In Lumba & Mighty, Lord Dyson emphasised that the rule of 
law required a transparent statement of the circumstances in which the broad statutory criteria 
would be exercised to detain a person.117 Lord Dyson stressed the importance of clear policy 
statements so that individuals knew the criteria being applied to them when detained by the 
executive.118 Additionally, Beatson LJ would have concluded (had it been necessary to decide 
the matter) that, on the evidence before the Court, detention could not be said to be 
justified.119 Following the case, the Home Office undertook to assess all asylum claimants in 
the DFT who were appealing and to release those who were not at risk of absconding. Very 
few were assessed as not presenting an absconding risk.  
 
Subsequently, the Minister for Immigration and Security suspended the DFT scheme.120 The 
government’s application to appeal against the Court of Appeal judgment was refused in 
November 2015.  The unravelling of fast track detention for protection seekers in the United 
Kingdom leaves one wondering what next? Strikingly there has, as yet, not been any 
declaration by the courts that detention for asylum claimants for administrative reasons is 
objectionable per se. Immigration detention with all its preventive (and at times punitive) 
undertones is under threat but appears here to stay.121  
 
Fairer Regulation of Immigration Detention 
The predicament analysed in this Chapter is not novel122 and it is fourfold. First, executive 
officials administer and apply the law and policy relating to deprivation of liberty absent 
effective oversight, that is, independent and impartial bodies (be they tribunals or courts) are 
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not routinely required to check detention decision-making (for example, through periodic 
appeals, statutory reviews or bail proceedings). Secondly, substantive unfairness arises 
because the necessity of detention is not rigorously scrutinised by officials on an individual 
basis (as is required under international human rights law norms), habitually it stems, 
reflexively, from the State’s characterisation of a person as unauthorised, unlawful or illegal. 
Thirdly, and relatedly, prolonged detention often occurs in a context that is procedurally 
unfair to detainees who are assessed by officials as posing a risk to the community, because 
the substantive merits and/or legality of the risk assessment are not effectively reviewable. 
Fourthly, the judiciary’s capacity to promote the rule of law through judicial review, by 
policing legal limits on detention, is restricted because of (i) the expansive purposes officially 
underpinning and informing the statutory mandate governing detention, and (ii) due to the 
looseness/uncertainty afflicting ‘reasonableness’ as a normative constraint on the duration of 
detention. 
 
In Australia, there is no access to an independent, impartial and effective review, entailing a 
proportionality-based analysis of detention for protection seekers, congruent with the views 
of the Australian Human Rights Commission and the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee.123 Reform is urgently required to address the arbitrary detention of particular 
groups of protection seekers onshore. First, a statutory right to prompt periodic review before 
an independent and impartial body is warranted to guard against bureaucratic inertia and 
arbitrariness pending refugee status/visa determinations.124 This would enable the detainee to 
check whether detention was merited (qua, necessary and proportionate) in individual 
circumstances. Importantly, a legal onus should rest on the immigration authorities to 
demonstrate, at regular intervals if required, the necessity and proportionality of detention 
after initial checks. Second, for ‘failed’ protection seekers (‘hard cases’, including Stateless 
people) who are detained pending removal, periodic access to external merits review to check 
the necessity and proportionality of ongoing detention where removal is sought but not 
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directly realisable. Third, for those ‘declared’ refugees subject to visa refusal or cancellation 
decisions on adverse security/character grounds,125 access to periodic merits review to enable 
careful reconsideration of whether the risks posed to society by an individual can be managed 
in a less restrictive way other than resorting to indefinite detention in high-security 
facilities.126 
 
Equally, in the United Kingdom, the necessity of detention has not been adequately 
scrutinised. While  recent case-law has confirmed the unfairness and injustice inherent in the 
DFT regime, and questions have been raised regarding the detention of ‘vulnerable 
people’,127 no decision has been taken declaring the use of (lengthy) detention for protection 
seekers (and other migrants) to be legally unacceptable. Nor has domestic human rights law 
or the ECHR obliged the United Kingdom to rigorously and transparently ground and justify 
the need for detention in individual cases. Arguably, the majority judges involved in the 
Saadi litigation, while declaring administrative detention at Oakington reception centre to be 
legal, did not anticipate that it would be used as extensively, and for as long, as it transpired.  
Immigration detention is also heavily politicised in the United Kingdom, and it is unlikely 
that the government will resist re-employing it in accelerated asylum cases; it may be a 
matter of time, therefore, before a replacement detained fast track system is introduced. In the 
meantime, advocates must persist with legal, evidence-based, arguments to promote reforms, 
aimed at ensuring that immigration detention is only used as ‘a measure of last resort’.128 
Conclusions 
This Chapter has examined a particular form of preventive justice: immigration detention for 
protection seekers. These detainees are held for general preventive (including deterrent) 
and/or administrative purposes, often in circumstances where they have not committed crimes 
(though there may have been civil law violations or anticipated infractions). Rather, 
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127 Shaw, above n 123.  
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protection seekers’ incarceration stems from their irregular movement and border crossings 
and concomitant ‘unauthorised’ status under municipal laws. Their confinement may persist 
for months, years even, pending entry-related decisions or removal, deportation or exclusion. 
 
Preventive immigration detention is highly problematical where it is applied indiscriminately 
and by reason of:  
(a) harm prevention (national security/public welfare/flight risk), in circumstances 
where the protection seeker is prevented from testing those grounds (and evidence) 
openly and effectively,  
(b) administrative convenience  an adjunct to (ostensibly, timely) adjudicative 
processes about protection seekers’ claims and their legal status, and  
(c) facilitating removal/deportation/exclusion of individuals, in circumstances where 
there is no real prospect of expulsion to another State.  
 
Additionally, judicial application of ‘reasonableness’, to delimit the lawful duration of 
detention, has not prevented prolonged and arbitrary periods of detention, while 
administrative processes are undertaken or removal/deportation/exclusion is realised. In view 
of the comparative case law explored in this Chapter, and the punitive experiences of many 
detainees, a better label for the form of preventive justice examined here would be preventive 
injustice.129 
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